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In recent years, American law has undergone a fundamental revision
of the rules that govern how trustees invest. In 1987 the American Law
Institute (ALI) began working on a partial revision of the Restatement of
Trusts devoted exclusively to modifying trust-investment law. The ALI
approved the new Restatement at its annual meeting in 1990 and released
the final text in 1992.1 Working from a preliminary text of the new
Restatement, Illinois enacted legislation in 1991 embodying the key
Restatement principles.2
In 1991 the Uniform Law Commission began a three-year drafting
project to codify the revised Restatement principles as a uniform law,
which became the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The Uniform Law
Commission promulgated the final text of the Act in 1994. The American
Bar Association approved the Act at its February 1995 midyear meeting."
Already in 1995 seven states enacted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act:
* Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University. This article
expands upon the Tamisiea Lecture presented at the University of Iowa, November 2, 1995.
Some themes of this article were sketched earlier in presentations to the 1995 annual meeting
of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, Scottsdale, Arizona, March 9-10, 1995.
Although I served as the reporter for the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, I must emphasize
that the views advanced in this article are mine and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Uniform Law Commission. Suggestions from Edward C. Halbach, Jr., and Roger bbotson
are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1992). Professor Edward C.
Halbach, Jr., of the University of California at Berkeley served as the reporter and principal
drafter. He has discussed the project in Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the
Third Restatement, 77 Iowa L Rev. 1151 (1992), substantially republished as Edward C.
Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J.
407 (1992); and Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Redefining the "Prudent Investor Rule" for Trustees,
129 Tr. & Est. 4 (Dec. 1990).
2. 760 ILCS §§ 5/5 (prudent investing), 5/5.1 (delegation) (1992). The principal
drafter has described the Illinois act in Lyman W. Welch, How the Prudent Investor Rule May
Affect Trustees, 130 Tr. & Est. 15 (Dec. 1991), substantially republished as Lyman W. Welch,
Action is Needed in Response to Changes in Fiduciary Investment Duty, 18 ACTEC Notes 81
(1992).
3. The Commission's proper name is National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
4. Uni£ Prudent Investor Act (1994), 7B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1995) [hereinafter UPIA].
5. Uniform acts are routinely submitted to the American Bar Association (ABA) for
approval. The relevant ABA sections customarily appoint advisors to the Uniform Law
Commission's drafting committees. The ABA advisor for the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
was Joseph Kartiganer.
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California,6  Colorado7 New Mexicos Oklahoma,9  Oregon," Utah,"
and Washington.12 The Uniform Act is expected to be widely enacted in
the years to come. In advance of the Uniform Act, several states enacted
legislation patterned on the 1992 Restatement or on the Illinois act;
including Kansas, 3 Florida, 4 Maryland,15 New York,' 6 South Dakota, 7
and Virginia.' We thus have a substantial core of states, including some
of the most populous, that have already enacted the Uniform Act or
something like it. I should also emphasize that the Restatement and the
Uniform Act did not invent the reforms that they embody, and that several
states, for example, Iowa 9 and Georgia,20 revised their statutes in
advance of the two national law reform projects to incorporate some of the
principles that now appear in the Restatement and in the Uniform Act.
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act implements a tightly interconnect-
ed set of reforms. These adjustments to the legal regime were driven by
profound changes that have occurred across the past generation in our
understanding of the investment function. This new learning about the
investment process is called the theory of efficient markets, or more
broadly, Modem Portfolio Theory (MPT).2 ' Four Nobel prizes in
economics have thus far been awarded for the academic work that
identified and verified the theory of efficient markets,n and more will
come. As I cover the main features of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, I
have the occasion to point out places in which the influence of MPT is
much in evidence. I have tried, however, to avoid the forbidding jargon of
the efficient market literature. Lawyers and courts can understand the
essential findings of MPT without mastering betas, capital asset pricing
models, correlation coefficients, and the like.
6. Cal. Prob. Code §§ 16045-54 (Deering 1995).
7. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-1.1-101 to 115 (Supp. 1995) (effectiveJuly 1, 1995).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-7-601 to 612 (Michie 1995) (effectiveJuly 1, 1995).
9. Okla. Stat. it. 60 §§ 175.60-.72 (Supp. 1995) (effective Nov. 1, 1995).
10. 1995 Or. Laws 157 (effective Sept. 9, 1995).
11. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-302 (1995) (effectiveJuly 1, 1995).
12. 1995 Wash. Laws 307 (effectiveJuly 1, 1995).
13. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-5004 (Supp. 1994).
14. Fla. Stat. chs. 518.11 (prudent investing) & 518.12 (1995) (delegation).
15. Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 15-106, 15-114 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
16. N.Y. Est Powers & Trusts Law § 11-2.3 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (Prudent Investor
Act). The New York legislation is based in part upon an early draft of the Uniform Act.
17. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 55-5-6 to 14 (Supp. 1995).
18. Va. Code Ann. § 26-45.1 (Michie 1992) (prudent investing).
19. Iowa Code Ann. § 633.123 (West 1992) (amended 1991).
20. Ga. Code Ann. § 53-8-2(c) (1995) (amended 1992).
21. A succinct and elegant introductory text on modem portfolio theory is R.A. Brealey,
An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks (2d ed. 1983). A convenient
exposition for lawyers is Jonathan R. Macey, An Introduction to Modem Financial Theory
(1991) (American College of Trust & Estate Counsel Foundation).
22. Franco Modigliani of MIT (1985), Harry Markowitz of CUNY (1990), Merton Miller
of Chicago (1990), and William Sharpe of Stanford (1990).
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This Article is meant to serve as a guide to the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act. I point to the main reforms and explain what motivated
them. I also attempt a look into the future, offering some predictions
about how trust-investment practice is likely to change as the principles
embodied in the Restatement and the Uniform Act take effect. Among the
changes foreseen are greater use of equities; of pooled investment vehicles,
such as mutual funds; and of relatively unconventional investments, such as
foreign securities and derivatives. I also speak of the tendency to break up
trusteeship and allocate its functions among specialized service providers. I
suggest that, even though the Uniform Prudent Investor Act is default law
that the settlor of the trust can alter or oust, the Act is likely to limit the
settlor's power to impose manifestly uneconomic investment restrictions. I
also explain why the new trust-investment law is likely to have unsettling
effects upon the seemingly quite distinct subject of principal-and-income
law, that is, upon the rules that govern the allocations that trustees are
commonly obliged to make between current and future beneficiaries of the
trust.
I. OLDER STANDARDS OF PRUDENT INVESTING
Before canvassing the Uniform Act, I want to cast a brief backward
glance at the trust-investment law that descended into the 1980s-the law
that the ALI and the Uniform Law Commission determined to reform.
Bear in mind that the rules of trust investment law that we are discussing
are default rules, rules that the settlor can alter by apt language in the
trust instrument.
English law got off to a bad start on trust investing. In 1719
Parliament authorized trustees to invest in shares of the South Sea
Company. A number of them did, and when the South Sea "Bubble" burst
the next year, share prices declined by 90 percent. The Chancellors took
fright and developed a restricted list of presumptively proper trust
investments, initially government bonds, later well-secured first mortgages.
Lord St. Leonard's Act in 1859 added East India stock, and across the
decades, some dribbles of legislation approved various other issues. Only in
1961 was the English statute amended to allow trustees to invest in equities
more generally, and even then the investment was subject to a ceiling of
half the trust fund.s That legislation remains in force, although an
official revision commission has begun to deliberate on reforming it.
Some American jurisdictions had a similar history in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, developing so-called legal lists24 of court-
23. A useful account of the history of trust investment law in England appears in A.11
Oosterhoff, Trustees' Powers of Investment: A Study Prepared at the Direction of the Ontario
Law Review Commission 6-23, 35-44, 49-59 (1970).
24. The New York case of King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869), came to exemplify legal-list
jurisprudence. The court restricted trustees to investments in government bonds or wel
secured mortgages and forbade corporate issues. The court reasoned that since a trustee
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approved or legislatively-approved investments, which were initially
restricted to government bonds and first mortgages, but grudgingly
expanded in some states to include selected corporate issues.
The path of the future in American law led away from legal lists,
however, and was forged in Massachusetts. In 1830, in the celebrated case
of Harvard College v. Amory,2s the Supreme Judicial Court adopted what
came to be known as the prudent man rule.
Trustees, said the Massachusetts court, should "observe how men of
prudence... manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but
in regard to the permanent disposition of their finds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be,,26
invested. The Massachusetts rule represented a great advancer by
abandoning the attempt to specify approved types of investment. Prudence
is another word for reasonableness, and the prudent man rule echoed the
contemporaneously developed reasonable man rule in the law of
negligence. The standard of prudent investing was the standard of industry
practice-what other trustees similarly situated were doing. Investment
practice under the prudent man rule led rapidly to judicial approval of the
use of corporate securities, both equities and bonds, in trust accounts. By
the 1940s many American states had adopted by statute a version of the
Massachusetts rule that the American Bankers Association promoted on
behalf of corporate fiduciaries.2 The Uniform Prudent Investor Act is
designed to replace that act.
The prudent man rule as applied by the courts came to be encrusted
with a strong emphasis on avoiding so-called "speculation," whatever that
meant.L (Recall the language from Harvard College v. Amory, cautioning
the trustee to invest "not in regard to speculation" and to treat "the
probable safety of the capital" as central.)m As late as the 1959
Restatement we find the assertion that "the purchase of shares of stock on
margin or purchase of bonds selling at a great discount because of
uncertainty whether they will be paid on maturity" is speculative and
cannot use the trust fund to operate a business, neither can the trustee invest in corporate
securities "in which [the trust fund] is necessarily exposed to the hazard of loss or gain,
according to the success or failure of the enterprise." Id. at 85-86.
25. 26 Mass.(9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
26. Id. at 461.
27. On the history of trust investment law in the United States, see Lawrence M.
Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 Yale U. 547, 551-72 (1964). SeL generally George G. Bogert
& George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 613-14 (rev. ed. 1983).
28. See Mayo A. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Ohio St. LJ. 491, 501-03 (1951).
For the text of the bankers' model act, the so-called Model Prudent Man Investment Act, see
Id. at 508-09.
29. Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule 5-6
(1986).
30. Quoted supra text accompanying note 26.
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imprudent s' In some jurisdictions investing in junior mortgages, no
matter how well secured, was per se imprudent 2 The view crystallized
that an investment in a "new and untried enterprise""3 was inherently
speculative and imprudent. Ludicrous judicial applications of the notion of
speculation continued in some jurisdictions into recent times.
M
Trustees in the first half of the twentieth century, preoccupied with
avoiding speculation and preserving capital, were inclined to emphasize
long-term government and corporate bonds as the characteristic trust
investment. Experience with inflation after World War II taught that bonds
placed significant inflation risk on the bondholder. Investments in debt
could therefore experience declines in real value as severe as in equities.
We now know that, in inflation-adjusted terms, the long-term real rate of
return on equities has greatly exceeded bonds. The Sinquefield/Ibbotson
studies estimate the inflation-adjusted rate of return on stocks since the
1920s at about 9 percent per year, as compared to about 3 percent for
bonds."" Fiduciaries have adapted to this knowledge, and through the
second half of the century, have tended to increase the proportion of
equity in trust accounts, at least in those trust accounts that can bear the
greater volatility of equities.
II. THE UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT
I turn now to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, with a view to
identifying and explaining its main reforms. As the title of the Act makes
dear, the legislation retains the prudence standard. As did the 1992
Restatement, the Act takes the opportunity to unisex the prudent man,
who has now become the prudent investor. The Act directs the trustee to
invest "as a prudent investor would ... ." 37
In giving content to the prudence label, the Act makes three great
changes in the law. All three were presaged in the 1992 Restatement. First,
the Act articulates a greatly augmented duty to diversify trust invest-
ments.ss Next, in place of the old preoccupation with avoiding
speculation, the Act substitutes a requirement of sensitivity to the risk
31. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227 cnt. f (1959).
32. 3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 227.6, at 448-49 (4th ed.
1988).
33. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227 cmt. f (1959).
34. For example, in First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 427
(Al. 1982), cet. denie4 461 U.S. 938 (1983), the Supreme Court of Alabama surcharged a
bank trustee for 17 disappointing stocks held in the bank's common trust fund. The court
reasoned that the 17 were speculative because the bank purchased them in part with a view to
obtaining capital appreciation when sold, and thus the issues had not been suitable long-term
trust investments.
35. Roger G. Ibbotson &Rex A. Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: Historical
Returns (1926-1978) 29-30 (2d ed. 1979).
36. UPIA §§ 1, 2(a).
37. Id. § 2(a).
38. Id. § 3.
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tolerance of the particular trust, directing the trustee to invest for "risk and
return objectives reasonably suited to the trust- "5 9 Finally, the Act reverses
the much criticized nondelegation rule of former law and actually
encourages trustees to delegate investment responsibilities to profession-
als.4°
A. Diversification
A duty to diversify trust investments has been recognized in American
trust law for about a century!' In recent decades the importance of
diversification has been increasingly emphasized among investment
professionals, and accordingly, the trustee's duty to diversify has become
more acute-for example, in ERISA, the 1974 federal pension legislation, a
fiduciary must diversify the investments of participants and beneficiaries to
minimize risk of loss unless doing so is dearly imprudent.4 The 1992
revision of the Restatement of Trusts integrated the duty to diversify into
the very definition of prudent investing.0
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act demands that the "trustee shall
diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably
determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust
are better served without diversifying."" The official Comment to the Act
identifies two situations in which resisting diversification might be
appropriate: first, when the tax cost of selling low-basis securities would
outweigh the gain from diversification; and second, when the settlor
mandates that the trust retain a family business. When, however, the trust
investor starts with cash in hand, failing to diversify is inexcuseable.
The emphasis on diversification also underlies another prominent
feature of the Uniform Act, the portfolio standard of care in section 2(b),
which reads: "A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting
individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of
39. Id. § 2(b).
40. Id. § 9.
41. E.g., Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890); Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 227 (1992). Many states have no explicit authority on point In In re Saegere Estates,
340 Pa. 73, 16 A.2d 19 (1940), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned the duty to
diversify. In view of the growing emphasis on the duty to diversify discussed in the text above,
I think it unlikely that Saegere would remain good law in Pennsylvania. Older New York cases
resistant to, or hesitant about, the duty to diversify are collected in 3 Scott & Fratcher, supra
note 32, § 228, at 505-06 n.10. A recent New York case imposes liability for a trust's excess
concentration of 71% of its assets in a single blue chip stock (Eastman Kodak) which
experienced a long decline in value. Estate of Jones, N.Y.UJ., Jul. 5, 1995, at 31 (Sur. Ct.
Monroe Cty. 1995) (I owe this reference to Richard Covey.) The New York prudent investor
act, supra note 16, mandates diversification and thus resolves the matter for New York
prospectively.
42. ERISA mandates "diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is dearly prudent not to do so." Employee
Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)(C) (1988).
43. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(b) (1992).
44. UPIA § 3 (emphasis added).
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the trust portfolio as a whole ... ."4 The official Comment says: "An
investment that might be imprudent standing alone can become prudent if
undertaken in sensible relation to other trust assets, or to other nontrust
assets." 46
This insistence on diversifying investments responds to one of the
central findings of Modem Portfolio Theory, that there are huge and
essentially costless gains to diversifying the portfolio thoroughly. To
understand why, begin with the obvious truth that some securities are
riskier than others. Investors demand to be paid to bear the greater risk.
For example, a start-up computer software company in Silicon Valley
entails a far larger risk of disappointing returns or total failure than does a
seasoned blue chip such as Mobil Oil or General Electric. If you are a
Silicon Valley entrepreneur who wants me to invest in your start-up firm,
you must offer me an expected return (that is, a combination of dividends
and capital appreciation on the securities) that is higher than Mobil or GE
will pay me in order to induce me to invest in your riskier venture. This
calculation is called the risk/return curve: The higher expected return on
the investment compensates me for bearing the greater risk of the
investment being disappointing.
Modem Portfolio Theory isolates three distinct components of the
risk of owning any security: market risk, industry risk, and firm risk. Market
risk is common to all securities; it reflects general economic and political
conditions, interest rates, and so forth. Industry risk, by contrast, is specific
to the firms in a particular industry or an industry grouping. Finally, firm
risk refers to factors that touch the fortunes only of the individual firm.
Thus, if we take the international oils for an example, we recall that all the
producers suffered from the 1973 Arab oil embargo (industry risk), but
only Exxon incurred the liabilities arising from the great Alaskan oil spill
of March 1989 (firm risk).
The capital market investigators have actually been able to compute
the approximate weight of the three elements that comprise the risk of
securities ownership. In round numbers, market risk has been reckoned at
30 percent; the risk of industry and other groupings at 50 percent; and
firm risk at 20 percent.47 These numbers underlie the intense preoccupa-
45. Id. § 2(b).
46. Id. § 2 cmt. ("Portfolio standard"). The UPIA's portfolio standard of care derives
from comparable language in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule
§ 227(a) (1992), which states that the prudent investor rule is "to be applied to investments
not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment
strategy.... ." The total portfolio standard decisively rejects the contrary strand in the older
case law;, that is "[t]he focus of inquiy... is... on the individual security as such, and
factors relating to the entire portfolio are to be weighed only along with others in reviewing
the prudence of the particular investment decisions." In re Bank of New York (Spitzer), 323
N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. 1974).
47. Brealey, supra note 21, at 117. Brealey's actual numbers are 31% market risk; 12%
industry risk; 37% other groupings; and 20% firm risk. The passage in the above text
consolidates industry and other groupings and rounds it to 50%.
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don with diversification as the means of reducing the risk of investing. By
definition, market risk cannot be eliminated through diversification, since
market risk is common to all securities. But industry risk and firm risk can
be reduced greatly through diversification. To continue with the example
of the oil industry, contrast an investor who owned only international oil
shares in 1973 with an investor whose portfolio was broadly diversified
across many industries. The oil embargo damaged the international oils
and the automobile and airline industries, but it triggered a boom in
domestic oils, in coal stocks, in synthetic fuels, in the energy conservation
firms, and in the oilfield equipment industry. We see, therefore, that
industry risk is often negatively correlated. Owning stocks in these other
industries would, in part, have offset the damage to the industries harmed
by the embargo.
Likewise, within an industry, diversification reduces risk Since I
cannot predict the Alaskan oil spill, or any other firm-specific hazard, I can
lower my exposure to such firm-specific risks by investing not only in
Exxon, but also BP, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, and the others. Indeed, it
commonly happens that the performance of firms in the same industry is
negatively correlated-the success of one firm comes at the expense of its
competitors. Efficient market theory instructs us that it is impossible to
outsmart the market by predicting which securities will do better or
worse.4 Owning many securities enhances the chances of offsetting losers
with winners.49
In the literature of Modem Portfolio Theory, a telling expression has
been coined to describe what is wrong with underdiversification:
uncompensated risk. No one pays the investor for owning too few stocks.
Recall that when I spoke of the difference between the Silicon Valley start-
up and Mobil Oil, I said that the greater risk intrinsic to the start-up was
reflected in its expected return. The investor faced with a choice between
mature blue chips and an imperiled new venture will prefer the blue chips
unless the new venture offers a superior return, a risk premium. Moving
out on the risk/return curve in this way, we routinely observe that the
investor who bears the greater risk is compensated for it. By contrast, no
one compensates the investor for having a portfolio that neglects to hold
securities in enough industries and firms to achieve effective diversification.
Underdiversification entails needless risk, risk that can be avoided by
constructing a sufficiently large and representative portfolio.
Diversification tends to push the investor toward very large portfolios.
Although much of the benefits of diversification can be achieved with a
carefully selected smaller portfolio,' optimal diversification probably
48. See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
49. Brealey computes that a one-stock portfolio will exhibit 40% variability in a year. A
market-matching portfolio exhibits 22% variability in a year. Thus, optimal diversification cuts
risk by almost half. Brealey, supra note 21, at 111-12 & Tbl. 7.1.
50. Brealey estimates that ten stocks exceptionally well-selected for diversification can
achieve 87% diversification; twenty such stocks, 93%; 50 such, 97%; 100 such, 98%. Id. at 112
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requires a portfolio containing hundreds of issues. Relatively few investors,
or for our purposes, relatively few trust funds have that much money to
invest. Accordingly, an investor who seeks to eliminate the uncompensated
risk of underdiversification will usually need to invest in some form of
pooled investment vehicle, such as mutual funds or bank common trust
funds.
B. Sensitivity to the Risk/Return Curve in
Place of the Ban on Speculation
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act eliminates the old categoric
restrictions on particular types of investments, such as the prohibition on
junior mortgages. Section 2(e) of the Act provides: "A trustee may invest in
any kind of property or type of investment consistent with the standards of
this [Act]." The official Comment explains:
The universe of investment products changes incessantly.
Investments that were at one time thought too risky, such as
equities, or more recently, futures, are now used in fiduciary
portfolios. By contrast, the investment that was at one time
thought ideal for trusts, the long-term bond, has been discovered
to import a level of risk and volatility-in this case, inflation
risk-that had not been anticipated.51
The idea that some securities are intrinsically too risky for trust
investors collides with the central findings of Modem Portfolio Theory.
MPT teaches that the risk intrinsic to any marketable security is
presumptively already discounted into the current price of the security.
Hence, on an expected return basis, the risk is compensated risk. Thus, for
example, there is no reason to think that the shares of a bankrupt
company are mispriced. The securities markets are so efficient at
discounting information about future profitability that today's price fully
impounds the future prospects for any firm, even a bankrupt firm, on an
expected value basis.
Furthermore, the risk of a high-risk investment can be materially
reduced through diversification. That is why sophisticated investors who
invest in start-up or otherwise fragile firms commonly employ venture
capital funds, which spread the risk of failure of any single firm across a
portfolio of many firms. The same logic underlies so-called vulture funds
that invest in bankrupt or troubled firms. Some of the firms will fail, but
many will thrive. A basket of such securities offers the likelihood of a high
net return on an expected return basis.
The drafters of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act reasoned that "trust
beneficiaries are better protected by... emphasis on dose attention to
risk/retur objectives... than in attempts to identify categories of
& Tl. 7.1.
51. UPIA § 2 cat. ("Abrogating categoric restrictions").
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investment that are per se prudent or imprudent."52 The heart of the Act,
section 2(b), states that the "trustee's investment and management
decisions" are required to "hav[e] risk and return objectives reasonably
suited to the trust."" The Act recognizes that investment returns correlate
strongly with risk. However, as the official Comment explains, "tolerance
for risk varies greatly with the financial and other circumstances of the
investor, or in the case of a trust, with the purposes of the trust and the
relevant circumstances of the beneficiaries." By way of illustration, the
Comment observes that if the "main purpose" of the particular trust "is to
support an elderly widow of modest means," that trust "will have a lower
risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great
wealth."s
Thus, the Act aspires to free trustees from the old preoccupation with
avoiding speculation. Should we expect to see future trust portfolios
stuffed with penny stocks, Polish zloty futures, and Czarist Russian bonds?
The answer, of course, is no. For most trusts and trustees, the outer
reaches of the risk/return distribution will be every bit as unsuitable as
before. What has changed is that the trustee is now able to examine the
risk tolerance of each particular trust and to tailor that trust's investment
policy accordingly.
C. Delegation
The last of the great reforms of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act is
to put the final nails in the coffin of the much criticized former rule that
forbade trustees to delegate investment and management functions.5
1. The Received Nondelegation Rule
The rule against delegating investment functions was a branch of the
general nondelegation rule of trust law. As formulated in the 1959
Restatement, the nondelegation rule places the trustee "under a duty to
the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the
trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform."57 The rationale
for the nondelegation rule has always been murky.'" The core notion is to
protect the settlor's reliance when the personality of the trustee is a vital
component of the settlor's intention. We can well imagine the case in
52. Id.
53. Id. § 2(b).
54. Id. § 2 cmt. ("Risk and return").
55. Id.
56. UPIA § 9. The nondelegation rule for investment matters as formulated in the second
Restatement reads: "A trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to select
investments." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 cmt. h (1959).
57. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 (1959). The second Restatement carries this
language forward from the first Restatement, see Restatement of Trusts § 171 (1935).
58. For discussion of the purposes of the rule, see John H. Langbein, Reversing the
Nondelegatlon Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 Mo. L Rev. 105, 106-10 (1994).
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which the settlor's decision to establish a trust is motivated by confidence
in the good judgment of the particular trustee, especially when the trust
bestows discretion upon the trustee in matters of distribution, that is, in
allocating shares among beneficiaries. Accordingly, we can understand a
rule that says that if the particular trustee accepts the trust, the trustee
cannot dump it off on someone else-at least not without following the
procedures for trustee resignation and trustee succession that are
contained in the trust instrument or in the default law.
The traditional nondelegation rule was, however, overbroad. Courts
tended to read the requirement that the trustee not delegate "acts which
the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform" 9 as a
prohibition on delegating any function that looked to be important. The
courts attempted to distinguish pedestrian activities, so-called ministerial
functions, which the trustee could delegate, from discretionary functions
that were nondelegable. The drafters of the second Restatement
perpetuated this standard even while admitting that they could identify no
"dear-cut line dividing the acts which a trustee can properly delegate from
those which he cannot properly delegate."6 The nondelegation rule
effectively forced the trustee to conduct personally all major aspects of
administering the trust, necessarily including investment. The second
Restatement was crystal dear about investing: "A trustee cannot properly
delegate to another power to select investments."6'
As the investment function has grown ever more complex, there is
ever less reason to believe that nonspecialists are fit to conduct it.
Especially when family members or other amateurs serve as trustees, the
need for outside investment expertise is often acute. The old
nondelegation rule permitted such trustees to take advice from outside
specialists, but required the trustees to go through the motions of
appearing to evaluate the advice and to form an independent judgment
about whether or not to follow it. Often enough, this resulted in de facto
delegation. "When the investment advisor 'recommends' and the trustee
routinely 'decides' to follow the advice, the trustee in reality is delegating
the selection of investments."6 2
Dissatisfaction with the nondelegation rule in investment matters
59. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 (1959). The second Restatement carries this
language forward from the first, see Restatement of Trusts § 171 (1935).
60. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 cmit. d (1959). Instead of a standard, the
second Restatement pointed to some illustrative factors, including "the amount of discretion
involved," the size of the assets in question, and the trustee's ability to deal with the matter."
Id. The emphasis on distinguishing delegable ministerial functions from nondelegable
discretionary functions has proved to be a labeling game, because "even the most menial of
tasks involves some discretion.... ." William L Cary & Craig B. Bright, The Delegation of
Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 Colun. I Rev. 207, 224 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
61. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 cmt. h (1959).
62. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law,
Am. B. Found. Res.J. 1, 20 (1976).
HeinOnline -- 81 Iowa L. Rev 651 1995-1996
81 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1996]
became intense. In recent decades a variety of special-purpose statutes
reversed the nondelegation rule for investment and other specialized
functions, the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in 1964,65 the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act in 1972,64 and ERISA,6 the
federal pension reform law, in 1974.' Early in the history of the mutual
fund industry, it was feared that a trustee could not properly invest in
mutual fund shares without violating the nondelegation rule (on the
theory that the trustee was delegating the investment choices to the mutual
fund manager).6 7 The mutual fund industry responded by securing
legislation that remains in force in most states expressly authorizing
trustees to invest in mutual funds.0
2. Abrogating the Nondelegation Ride
The 1992 Restatement achieves a major reform of the nondelegation
rule. Nominally, the Restatement leaves the general nondelegation
principle intact, but effectively reduces it to a subrule of the duty of
prudent administration and makes it easy to overcome. The new rule
reads: "A trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of
the trusteeship except as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities
to others."69 Applying that norm to the investment function, the new
Restatement not only empowers the trustee to delegate investment and
management powers, it provides that the trustee "may sometimes have a
duty.., to delegate [investment] function... in such manner as a
prudent investor would delegate under the circumstances."70
The Uniform Act follows the Restatement in crafting a delegation
regime. Section 9(a) empowers the trustee to "delegate investment and
management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could
properly delegate under the drcumstances."7' As replacement safeguards,
the Act imposes duties of care, skill, and caution on trustees in selecting
agents, in formulating the terms of the delegation, and in reviewing "the
63. 7B U.LA. 743 (1985).
64. 7A U.L.A. 705 (1985).
65. ERISA§ 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3).
66. The pro-delegation measures in these statutes are discussed in Langbein, supra note
58, at 111-14.
67. So held in Marshall v. Frazier, 159 Or. 491, 80 P.2d 42 (Or. 1938), rejected in In re
Rees, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1949).
68. ERg., Cal. Prob. Code § 16223 (Deering 1991); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 362.550 (1994); N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 3B:14-13 (1994).
69. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 (1992) (emphasis
added).
70. Id. § 171 mt. j. The new Restatement makes dear that the trustee must "exercise
prudence in the degree or manner of delegation. Prudence thus requires the exercise of care,
skill, and caution in the selection of agents and in negotiating and establishing the terms of
delegation." Id. § 171 ant. a.
71. UPIA § 9(a).
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agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.""
The Act provides that the trustee who complies with these standards "is not
liable.., for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function
was delegated.""3 Instead, an aggrieved beneficiary must look exclusively
to the agent, who "owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to
comply with the terms of the delegation." 74
The official Comment explains the "tension"75 inherent in a
permissive delegation rule. "If the trustee delegates effectively, the
beneficiaries obtain the advantage of the agent's specialized investment
skills or whatever other attributes induced the trustee to delegate."
76
However, "if the trustee delegates to a knave or an incompetent, the
delegation can work harm upon the beneficiaries."7 The requirement
that the trustees use care, skill, and caution in selecting agents, in
formulating the terms, and in monitoring compliance "is designed to strike




In connection with delegation, I conclude this survey of the main
features of the Uniform Act by directing attention to a seemingly unrelated
provision of the Act, section 7, which deals with investment costs. It
provides that "[i]n investing and managing trust assets, a trustee may only
incur costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets,
the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee."7 9 There is nothing
novel about the trustee's duty to minimize costs in every facet of trust
administration As the official Comment remarks, "Wasting beneficiaries'
money is imprudent. In devising and implementing strategies for the
investment and management of trust assets, trustees are obliged to
minimize costs." 8
72. Id. § 9(a) (3).
73. Id. § 9(c).
74. Id. § 9(b).
75. Id. § 9 cmt. ("Protecting the beneficiary against unreasonable delegation").
76. UPIA § 9 cat.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Comment continues:
The trustee's duties of care, skill, and caution in framing the terms of the
delegation should protect the beneficiary against overbroad delegation. For example,
a trustee could not prudently agree to an investment management agreement
containing an exculpation clause that leaves the trust without recourse against
reckless mismanagement. Leaving one's beneficiaries remediless against willful
wrongdoing is inconsistent with the duty to use care and caution in formulating the
terms of the delegation.
Id.
79. Id. § 7.
80. SeeRestatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959).
81. UPIA§ 7 cmt.
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The Uniform Act foresees that practice under the Act's permissive
delegation regime will be a main sphere for applying the duty to minimize
costs. The official Comment observes: "The trustee must be alert to protect
the beneficiary from 'double dipping.' If, for example, the trustee's regular
compensation schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the
investment management function, it should ordinarily follow that the
trustee will lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an
outside manager."8
III. THE FUTURE OF TRUST INVESTING
What will the future bring under this new legal regime for trust
investing?
A. Greater Use of Equities
This Article has emphasized that the new Restatement and the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act are designed to liberate trust investors from
the former preoccupation with "avoiding speculation." Extremely
conservative investing will continue to be appropriate for trust accounts
that cannot bear the volatility of riskier assets. But for trusts that can bear
some exposure to the greater volatility characteristic of equities, the
superior long-term returns will justify the risk. As a practical matter,
therefore, the Uniform Act's invitation to trustees to tailor investments to
the risk tolerance of the particular trust is likely to result in greater use of
equities, apart from the most risk-averse trustses
Charitable trusts and foundations are particularly likely candidates for
increasing their exposure to equities. The Prefatory Note to the Uniform
Act observes that although the "Act is centrally concerned with the
investment responsibilities" of private trusts, "the prudent investor rule also
bears on charitable" trusts.8 Because charitable trusts and foundations
82. Id. § 9 cmt. ("Costs"). For more on the concern with double dipping in delegation
policy, see Langbein, supra note 58, at 108-09.
83. A leading New York corporate fiduciary, Bankers Trust, has published a statement on
the Investment ramifications of New York's version of the prudent investor act, see supra note
16. Bankers Trust foresees as "a probable result of Prudent Investor legislation ... an increase
in the proportion of equities in trust accounts." Bankers Trust New York Corp., Investment
Implications of the Prudent Investor Act 3 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bankers
Trust Statement]. The statement reasons: "Generally, a higher equity exposure produces
higher variability of trust values, and therefore, more risk. However, this incremental risk can
be mitigated through diversification." Id.
Using a variety of empirical data, a recent finance study concludes that the traditional
prudent man standard explains the tendency of bank fiduciary investors to overemphasize the
equities of large mature companies, by comparison with the greater risk-tolerance shown by
mutual funds and other types of institutional investors. Diane Del Guercio, The Distorting
Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional Equity Investments, 40 J. Fin. Econ. 31
(1996).
84. UPIA, Prefatory Note ("Implications for charitable and pension trusts") (citing the
1959 Restatement for the familiar proposition that "[i]n making investments of trust funds the
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have exceptionally long time horizons in comparison with the typical
private trust, they are uniquely suited to ride out the down-market cycles
that inhere in stock-market investing."
5
B. More Pooling, Less Individual Security Selection
My most confident prediction is that the future will see trustees
making ever greater use of pooled investment vehicles. it will be ever less
common for a trustee to construct a portfolio of individually selected
securities. Increasingly, the main work of the fiduciary investor will be what
has come to be called asset allocation. The trustee will form a view of the
needs, resources, and risk tolerances of the beneficiaries of the particular
trust. The trustee will then decide what proportion of the portfolio to
invest in what classes of assets. These choices will take the form of
allocating the trust assets among large, diversified portfolios, primarily
mutual funds and bank common trust funds. Under the Uniform Act, both
the enhanced duty to diversify and the portfolio standard of care point us
in that direction. As I have previously emphasized, few trusts have the
resources to achieve thorough diversification without using pooled vehicles.
The movement away from individual stock selection responds to the
two central discoveries of Modem Portfolio Theory. One of these findings
I have already discussed-the large and essentially costless returns to be
had from optimizing diversification. The other great lesson from MPT is
the understanding of why individual stock selection is so perilous-why,
that is, investors find it so hard to pick winners and to avoid losers. For
persons who are not familiar with the remarkable insights of MPT on this
subject, a brief overview may be useful.
1. Empirical Evidence on Institutional Portfolios
Over the past generation, dozens of research projects, mostly
conducted from university finance departments, have produced astonishing
empirical data on the investment performance of professional portfolio
managers. The early studies were based on data from investment
companies, that is, mutual funds, but subsequent studies have replicated
the results for other types of institutional portfolios. These studies have
found that professionally managed institutional portfolios as a group
actually underperformed the broad stock market averages such as the
Standard and Poor's 500 stock index . 6 "The funds did not show superior
trustee of a charitable trust is under a duty similar to that of the trustee of a private trust.
Restatement of Trusts § 389 (1959).").
85. The case for greater equity exposure in charitable portfolios is developed in John A.
Edie & Lowell S. Smith, Let Go of Your Old Investment Assumptions, Foundation News, Jan.-
Feb. 1994, at 34. See also John A. Edie & Lowell S. Smith, Investing in U.S. Securities Is a
Violation of Your Fiduciary Duty, Foundation News, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 24; John A. Edie, The
Prudent Investor and Charitable Trusts, 133 Trusts & Estates, Dec. 1994, at 35.
86. See Brealey, supra note 21, at 54-55 (summarizing data for mutual funds from 1955-
1964 and for bank, insurance company, and investment managers' portfolios from 1968-77).
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judgment either in picking stocks or anticipating general market
movements."87 Further, no individual fund outperformed the market with
a consistency greater than the law of averages would predicts A fund that
performed well one year was as likely to perform poorly the next year as it
was to continue doing well.
Similar results continue to be reported. For example, across the ten
years ending in 1993, the Morningstar mutual fund research organization
found that "diversified U.S. stock funds returned an average 12.8%,
compared with 14.9% for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index." '9 An
important scholarly examination of pension fund investments in common
stocks published in 1992 concluded that "pension fund equity managers
seem to subtract rather than add value relative to the performance of the
Standard & Poor's 500 Index." ° The authors of the study computed that
managed U.S. pension equity portfolios underperform the unmanaged
averages by about 1.5 percent, which translates to a loss of about $15
billion a year.91
I began learning about this empirical work on securities prices in the
early 1970s as a young law teacher at the University of Chicago, which was
then a hotbed of efficient market research. I still remember my initial
sense of disbelief about the findings, because they were so counterintuitive.
How was it possible that the sophisticated and experienced investment
professionals managing the great institutional portfolios could achieve
results so disappointing? These managers were the best and the brightest.
They worked under compensation arrangements that gave them powerful
incentives to achieve the best possible results in the portfolios that they
managed. Yet the data showed that they couldn't even hit the side of the
bam, in the sense that they had been unable to match the performance of
the broad market averages.
In 1973 Burton Malkiel published his celebrated popularization of
Modem Portfolio Theory, titled A Random Walk Down Wall Street, a book
now in its fifth edition. He taunted the professionals with the claim "that a
blindfolded chimpanzee throwing darts at the [stock tables in the] Wall
Street Journal can select a portfolio that performs as well as those managed
by the experts." 92 The book caused some resentment, because as Malkiel
87. James H. Lorie & Mary T. Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 95
(1973) (summarizing study done by Peter Williamson, Measuring Mutual Fund Performance,
Fin. AnalystsJ., Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 78-84).
88. See Brealey, supra note 21, at 55.
89. Jonathan Clements, Boggled by Fund Picking?, Wall St.J., May 20, 1994, at Cl.
90. Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Schleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, The Structure and
Performance of the Money Management Industry, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Microeconomics 339, 378 (M. Baily & C. Winston eds., 1992) [hereinafter Lakonishok].
91. Id. at 379.
92. Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 14 (5th ed. 1990).
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later acknowledged, "financial analysts in pin-striped suits do not like being
compared with bare-assed apes."
93
2. Efficient Markets
What explains this astonishing evidence? Why have the professional
investment managers performed so poorly? Modem Portfolio Theory
supplies a crisp answer to that question. In a nutshell, the insight is that
the professional portfolio managers are not incompetent bunglers, indeed,
just the opposite. They are so good at what they do that they effectively
cancel each other out.
To understand why, start with the basics.4 The price of a security
represents the present discounted value of its future earnings. Further, for
every buyer there must be a seller-someone who has formed an opposite
judgment about the value of that future earnings stream at the security's
current price. If all investors agreed that a particular security was a bargain
at its current price, no one who owned the security would sell it at that
price. Only an increase in price would induce sellers to sell. This is why we
can say that, presumptively, any security is correctly priced at its current
trading level.
To outperform the market-that is, consistently to identify
undervalued or overvalued securities in advance of other investors-an
investor must predict future earnings with superior speed and accuracy.
But here the task becomes daunting. New information about individual
companies is disseminated rapidly as a result of modem communications
systems. The securities laws have largely choked off inside information as a
source of advantage in trading. Economic developments, technological
innovation, foreign affairs, political events, social changes-all profoundly
affect the prices of securities, yet these phenomena are notoriously difficult
to foresee.
Professional securities analysts are thus largely limited to interpreting
information already in the public domain and available to other analysts.
In order to outperform the market the portfolio manager has to be
consistently better at making such interpretations than the thousands of
competing professionals who are interpreting the same data. The theory of
efficient markets posits that everything that is known or knowable about
the price of a publicly traded security is already fully reflected in its price. The
securities markets are so efficient in discounting information and pricing
securities that not even the professionals can consistently identify
undervalued and overvalued securities before other investors get there.
The indifferent performance record of professional investment managers
is, therefore, "exactly what we should expect in an efficient market."95
93. Id. at 24.
94. The following three paragraphs derive from John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner,
The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.BA J. 887, 888 (1976).
95. Brealey, supra note 21, at 55.
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One response to the lesson that you cannot beat the market is that
you might make a considered judgment to cease attempting it, especially if
you can pocket the savings from not trying. A vast proportion of all
fiduciary investing is now conducted "passively," in so-called index or
market funds. These funds undertake simply to replicate the performance
of the broad market indexes.96 In the mid-1970s when market funds first
appeared, they attracted only a few hundred million dollars, most of it
from the AT&T pension funds. Today, hundreds of billions of dollars in
American equities are indexed.97
3. Inefficient Markets
Not all markets are efficient. The reason that Malkiel's dart-throwing
chimpanzee can outperform most of the professionals is that the chimp is
throwing darts at a table of market prices. The chimp is a free rider, taking
advantage of the accuracy of the information already impounded in the
published prices for publicly traded securities. But some assets do not have
a market price. Two such classes of assets that are prominent in family
wealth, and hence tend to show up in trusts, are real estate and dose
corporations. There is no market price for your house. Your house is
unique, hence yesterday's trade of a house nearby does not accurately
value your house. Likewise, because there is no orderly market for dose
corporation shares, the chimp with the darts cannot hit a market price for
them.
To conclude: Modem Portfolio Theory has taught us that the game of
stock picking is costly and futile for most investors, especially small
investors, while emphasizing the large and essentially costless gains that are
to be had from maximizing diversification. These twin insights point the
fiduciary investor-that is, the prudent investor-strongly toward the use of
pooled investment vehicles that are large enough to achieve high levels of
diversification at reasonable cost. The investment path of the future for
trusts, especially smaller trusts, is the mutual fund or the bank common
trust fund.
96. The 1992 Restatement makes dear that investing in index funds is prudent.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 cmt. h (1992); id. reporter's note,
§ 227, at 78-79.
97. It has recently been computed that the 200 largest defined benefit pension funds
hold $377 billion in index funds, of which $284 billion is in domestic equities, $35 billion in
foreign equities, and the rest in bonds. The 200 largest defined contribution funds hold $84
billion in index funds, $80 billion of it in equities, the rest in bonds. Pensions & Investments,
Jan. 22, 1996, at 62-63. The same journal reported total domestic indexed assets of tax-exempt
investors (mostly pension funds) at above $600 billion as of December 1, 1995. Indexed Assets
Leap 39.9% for Year, Pension & Investments, Feb. 19, 1996, at 1.
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C. International Investing
By freeing trustees from the old concern to avoid speculation, and by
relieving them of the categoric restrictions forbidding particular sorts of
investments, the Restatement and the Uniform Act will make it easier for
the trust investor to include in the portfolio relatively novel types of assets,
when such assets are likely to enhance diversification or to improve
expected return on a risk-adjusted basis.
The best example of this new openness to fiduciary investing is
occuring in foreign securities. Until the 1980s, it was relatively uncommon
to find foreign securities in American trust portfolios s There have been
a variety of quite legitimate concerns about investing abroad. The liquidity
of most foreign markets is inferior to that of the American markets,
transaction costs on foreign exchanges are higher, the regulatory and
accounting standards abroad are often less exacting than in the United
States, and currency risk introduces a further source of volatility.
Nevertheless, these drawbacks pale when contrasted against the great
advantages of international investing.
Foreign securities enhance diversification. As of year-end 1994,
American equities constituted 35.1 percent of the capitalization of the
world's equity markets. "To ignore non-U.S. markets is to ignore 64.9
percent of the total global market." 9 Furthermore, the world's securities
markets tend to move against each other rather than in alignment Back in
the early 1980s Richard Brealey showed "that a well diversified
international portfolio is only about... two thirds as risky as a diversified
portfolio of U.S. stocks."1°° Returns so superior led Brealey to conclude:
"You need a very positive reason not to invest a significant proportion of
your stock portfolio overseas." 01
Investing abroad has boomed. Between 1973 and 1992, total
international equity mutual fund assets increased from $800 million to over
$43 billion.0 2 There has been a comparable increase in international
investing among pension funds, charitable endowments, bank common
trust funds, and other fiduciary investors. Using data from the National
Association of College and University Business Officers, the New York Times
98. The 1959 Restatement recalled. "In the earlier decisions the courts were inclined to
look with disfavor on investments outside the United States or even outside the State in which
the trust was administered. It is quite otherwise today." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227
cmt. 1 (1959).
99. Ibbotson Associates, "World Equity Market Capitalization" (1995) (on file with
author).
100. Brealey, supra note 21, at 118. Extensive supporting data is reviewed in Bruno Solnik,
International Investments 91-116 (3d ed. 1995). It has recently been argued that most of the
superior returns associated with foreign stocks in recent years result from currency
fluctuations, and that among foreign stocks, only the small stock and riskier so-called "value"
stocks enhance returns. Rex A. Sinquefield, Where are the Gains from International
Diversification?, Fin. AnalystsJ. 8 (Jan-Feb. 1996).
101. Brealey, supra note 21, at 121.
102. Ibbotson Associates, "Growth of International Investing" (1995) (on file with author).
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recently reported that 7.5 percent of college and university endowments
are now invested in foreign equities. For Yale University, the Times
reported 12 percent of the endowment in foreign equities.'03 Foreign
holdings constituted 7.2 percent of the assets of United States pension
funds as of 1993 and are projected to reach 11.5 percent in 1998.'0
The 1992 Restatement expressly endorses trust investment in foreign
securites.15 The Uniform Act does not single out any asset class for
special approval, but by emphasizing diversification, the total-portfolio
standard of care, and the abrogation of categoric restrictions on types of
investment, the Uniform Act leaves no doubt that it buttresses international
investing.'06
D. Derivatives
Derivatives constitute another category of unconventional assets
destined to become more prominent in fiduciary portfolios. Scandals
connected with the use of derivatives have been front page news in recent
months. Rogue traders have inflicted huge losses on the Daiwa Bank, on
the Common Fund, and on the venerable but now defunct Barings Bank.
Companies as sophisticated as General Electric and Proctor & Gamble are
litigating about large losses sustained from investments in derivatives.
Orange County, California, is in bankruptcy thanks to the county
treasurer's penchant for investing in derivatives.'0° From a distance,
therefore, derivatives seem to be well worth avoiding, especially if you are a
trustee charged with investing prudently for your beneficiaries.
As is so often the case, however, the headlines tell only part of the
story. The scandals involve cases in which derivatives were used in a fashion
that increased portfolio risk enormously. Embarrassed investors were
effectively placing immense bets on the future of interest rates, or in the
case of Barings, on the future price levels of the Japanese stock market.
103. Universities Taking on Risks to Overcome Fiscal Squeeze, N.Y. TaiesJuly 24, 1995, at
Al, A7.
104. Solnik, supra note 100, at576.
105. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, crnts. f, 1 (1992); id.
reporter's note, at 97-98.
106. The Bankers Trust Statement, "Investment Implications of the Prudent Investor Act,"
accords:
Many non-U.S. investments behave differently from U.S. equity and fixed
income securities, thereby providing incremental returns without increasing risk
levels. In many cases, [non-U.S. investments] can actually reduce risk. This reduction
of volatility, or risk management, is the primary reason for the trend toward global
portfolio management.
Bankers Trust Statement, supra note 83, at 4.
107. Some of these adventures are recounted in George Crawford, A FiduciaryDuty to Use
Derivatives?, 1 Stan. J.L Bus. & Fm. 307 (1995); and Donald L Horwitz, Derivatives: The
Basics on Terms and Risks, 5 Bus. L. Today 38 (Sept.-Oct. 1995), which also contains a useful
introduction to the typology of derivatives. For an extensive discussion of the characteristics of
derivatives and their use in portfolio management, see The Handbook of Fixed Income
Securities 1077-1274 (FrankJ. Fabozzi et al. eds., 4th ed. 1995).
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Such investments are highly unlikely to qualify in a private trust account
under any formulation of prudence, because the downside risk is larger
than the risk tolerance of almost any trust investor.
There are, however, risk-reducing uses of derivatives. The Uniform
Act's abrogation of categoric restrictions on types of investments allows
trustees to use derivatives in such cases. George Crawford, in his
intriguingly titled article, "A Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives?," illustrates
a particularly compelling case.'"8 Crawford posits a situation involving an
elderly woman whose assets consist disproportionately of a large block of
shares in the Philip Morris Company. She bought the shares decades ago,
and they have appreciated hugely. She goes to the local bank and sets up a
trust for herself for life, with the remainder to her siblings. She transfers
the Philip Morris shares to the trust, together with her other holdings. The
trust is seriously underdiversified; sixty percent of its assets are tied up in
Philip Morris stock. Alas, the bank as trustee faces a difficult problem:
Selling Philip Morris stock would result in a taxable gain, with perhaps 30
percent of the proceeds being lost to taxation. Under the rule that allows
stepped-up basis at death, that tax liability would be completely avoided if
the trust retained the stock until the settlor's death.
In traditional trust administration, the trustee would be faced with a
choice between selling the shares, thus incurring the tax cost; or holding
the shares and running the risk of underdiversification. In Crawford's
parable, the trustee opts to hold and remain underdiversified. Soon
thereafter, Philip Morris plunges from $78 per share to $52 per share.'9
Crawford suggests that the trustee had a third alternative, an alternative so
compelling that the trustee might be liable for breach of the duty of
prudent investing for failing to have taken it. The trustee should have
bought a derivative, a put option on Philip Morris common, that would
have increased in value in the event that the price of the underlying
common stock declined. Buying put options can be costly, but for a
number of large capitalization stocks, including Philip Morris, low-cost put
options called LEAPS ("long-term equity appreciations") can be purchased.
Crawford runs the numbers and shows that the advantage to holding the
Philip Morris and offsetting the risk of decline by buying LEAPS is so
overwhelming by comparison either with selling the shares and paying the
tax bill or doing nothing and risking the loss from underdiversification
that the prudence standard should compel the use of the derivative.
As Crawford's example suggests, I think we can confidently predict
that the coming decades will witness ever greater use of risk-reduction
strategies employing derivatives in trust portfolios.
108. Crawford, supra note 107.
109. Crawford, supra note 107, at 313.
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E. Reduced Deference to the Paper Trail
An odd trait of the older trust investment law in deciding whether a
trustee has invested prudently has been the inclination to give great weight
to the trustee's internal procedures for investing and monitoring
investments. If a corporate trustee's file recites a plenitude of deliberation
-an investment committee, a securities selection committee, and a
portfolio manager for the particular trust, all busily pumping quarterly
memoranda about their due deliberateness into the file-the courts have
sometimes been willing to treat this paper trail as presumptive evidence of
prudence."1 A practitioner treatise remarks on this phenomenon: "In
cases involving the propriety of investments, the decision-making process
may be as important as the decision itself, at least for purposes of
determining the trustee's responsibility."
111
I suspect that the courts have tended to faHll back on evidence of
seemingly sound internal procedures because the substantive standard of
prudent investing has been so imprecise. Proceduralism is a common
retreat in fields in which substantive law provides inadequate guidance
-American administrative law is a prominent example. For the future,
however, particularly as regards the intensified duty to diversify under the
new Restatement and the Uniform Act, I predict that the courts will feel
less need to retreat to the proceduralism of the paper trail. No amount of
paper trail can excuse the five-bond or ten-stock portfolios still found in
too many trust accounts.
The greater objectivity and precision of the modem standards for
prudent investing manifest themselves well beyond the duty to diversify.
For example, as trust investing moves toward ever greater use of broad-
based portfolios, it will become easier to measure investment performance
and to identify substandard returns. Many types of mutual funds and
common trust funds are easily comparable. Most sponsors offer the
chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry of corporate bond portfolios-short,
intermediate, and long term. Most offer a comparable array of U.S.
treasury bond funds. And we are now seeing ever increasing standardiza-
tion of types of equity funds.
Consider, therefore, a simple case. Suppose that a trustee determines
to invest twenty percent of the trust in an intermediate-term bond fund.
Suppose, further, that the particular intermediate bond fund that the
trustee chooses persistently underperforms other intermediate-term bond
funds on account of drastically higher expense ratios. In view of the
trustee's duty to monitor, 2 the burden will more easily shift to the
trustee to explain why the trustee chose that particular fund. Under the
110. Perhaps the most exaggerated example is Stark v. United States Trust Co., 445 F.
Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a gullible opinion by the normally perceptive Judge Edward
Welnfeld.
111. A. Walter Nossaman et al., Trust Administration and Taxation § 29.05[2] (1995).
112. UPIA § 9(a), supra text accompanying note 72.
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prudence standard, the comparability of increasingly standardized fund
types will allow trustees (and the courts who oversee trustees when
beneficiaries are unhappy) greater precision in examining investment
performance. The point is not that a disappointing fund or fund year is
ipso facto imprudent-far from it. The point is that the growing
comparability of fund types provides a more precise and objective
benchmark for evaluating claims that a certain fund is so manifestly
inferior to competitors that investing in it, or retaining it, is imprudent.
F. Increased Scrutiny of Uneconomic Settlor Instructions
I would also predict that the greater clarity of the new trust
investment law will result in less deference to the wishes of the trust settlor
in an uncommon but troubling case-the case in which the settlor
attempts to impose a manifestly stupid investment restriction on the trust.
Take as the starting point the proposition, strongly endorsed in
section 1 (b) of the Uniform Act,115 that almost all trust law is default law,
rules that yield to the contrary wishes of the settlor. Trust law presumes
that the settlor has the best interests of the beneficiaries at heart when the
settlor imposes restrictions on the disposition of trust property. If, for
example, I leave my summer cottage on Lake Adams in trust for my
children with instructions that it not be sold but kept in the family for
recreational use, that instruction will be honored even if the beneficiaries
would rather not set foot on the shores of Lake Adams ever again. 4
Under conventional American trust law, the settlor's property rights are
indulged. As settlor, I am entitled to decide what is best for my
beneficiaries, subject only to the rule against perpetuities.
There are, however, limitations. If I devise property to a trust
directing that the trustee erect equestrian statues of me in public squares
in Iowa, that provision will be invalidated. A private trust must be for the
benefit of the beneficiaries; a charitable trust must satisfy standards of
public benefit. The trust to endow Iowa with bronze, equestrian Langbeins
achieves neither 5
Even when the settlor's instruction is not manifestly loony, the
deviation doctrine allows a court to alter an unwise investment restriction
"if necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust."116 The leading case
113. "The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded, restricted, eliminated,
or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust." UPIA § 1(b), 7B U.LA. 18 (Supp. 1995).
114. "If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the
trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination." Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 337(2) (1959).
115. Id. § 418(c) (invalidating trusts for capricious purposes); accod id. § 124 cmt. g.
Compare M'Caig v. University of Glasgow, [1907] Sess. Cas. 231 (Scotland), voiding a trust to
erect statues of the testator and other family members on lands devised by the testator,
discussed in 2 Scott & Fratcher, supra note 32, § 124.7, at 277-78. On the public benefit
standard, the so-called doctrine of chartiable purposes, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 368 (1959).
116. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167(1) (1959).
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involved a trust set up by Joseph Pulitzer for his children, in which he
forbad the trustees to sell the New York World newspaper. When the paper
became unprofitable, the trustees received judicial approval to sell it
anyhow."' The reasoning in such cases is that subsequent experience has
revealed a conflict between the settlor's dominant purpose, which is to
benefit the trust beneficiaries; and the settlor's subsidiary purpose, which is
to benefit them in a particular way-sin Pulitzer, by keeping the New York
World in the trust. The court is simply preferring the dominant purpose, in
order to carry out the settlor's presumed intent.
Suppose, however, that the trust instrument in Pulitzer had foreseen
and recited the danger that the paper might become unprofitable, and
had directed retention of the investment in any event. I have no doubt that
the court in Pulitzer would have ordered the trustees to sell the newspaper
despite the settlor's direction to retain it. The settlor's instruction to retain
the newspaper at all costs would come to resemble my instruction to litter
the Iowa landscape with equestrian statues. If the settlor directs an
objectively stupid investment policy, the court will direct deviation even
though the settlor anticipates the circumstance."" The settlor is
presumed to intend to benefit the beneficiaries, but if it can be shown that
a term of the trust manifestly harms their interests, the court will order
deviation from it. A private trust must be for the benefit of the
beneficiaries.
Now consider a type of investment instruction that is closer to
reality."" The settlor has worked all his life for, let us say, iBM. Through
stock options and company sponsored investment plans, he has
accumulated a large block of IBM common stock He dies, leaving the
block in trust with instructions not to sell it. The block is the only
substantial asset of the trust, and because the settlor's death results in a
stepped-up basis, selling the block incurs no tax cost. Suppose, further,
that the settlor leaves a letter explaining his thinking. "I worked for IBM
for 35 years, they were wonderful to me, they helped me buy the stock,
and the stock zoomed in value throughout my career. You just cannot do
better."
What is happening in this case is that the settlor is imposing his
supposed investment wisdom on the trust in circumstances in which the
investment strategy is objectively stupid and imprudent. We now know that
the advantages of diversifying a portfolio of securities are so great that it is
117. In re Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1931), aff'd nem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1932).
118. E.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (holding void certain
restrictions as to the height of buildings to be erected on trust real estate because "the
restrictions are opposed to the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust").
119. The reported cases instance trusts with permission to retain rather than outright
direction. See, ag., Baldus v. Bank of Cal., 530 P.2d 1350 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975); Warmack v.
Crawford, 195 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); Fast Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hosp.
192 N.E. 150 (Mass. 1934).
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folly not to do it. I am not saying that you can never have an
underdiversified trust fund. It will remain common to place a family firm
or a family farm in trust, notwithstanding that such a trust will often be
underdiversified. There's nothing wrong with using a trust as part of the
succession arrangements for a family enterprise. I further concede,
following the official Comment to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, 2
that there will remain cases in which the tax cost of diversifying a low-basis
asset may outweigh the gain.12 1 When, however, the trust assets are cash
or cash-equivalent, in the sense that diversification can be achieved at little
cost, I believe that the courts will come to view the advantages of
diversification as so overwhelming that the settlor's interference with
effective diversification will be found to be inconsistent with the
requirement that a private trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiary.
G. Fractionation of Trusteeship
Trusteeship entails three relatively distinct functions: investment,
administration, and distribution. Investment includes not only the initial
selection of securities or other assets, but also the tasks of monitoring the
investments for continuing suitability, investing new funds, and voting the
shares. Administration includes the range of accounting, reporting, and tax
filing. The responsibility for taking custody of securities is another branch
of trust administration. Unusual trust assets may require other administra-
tive work-maintaining and leasing real estate, insuring and safekeeping
the Picasso and the diamond tiara, and so forth. Distribution is sometimes
mechanical, but trust instruments often bestow upon trustees the discretion
to spray, sprinkle, invade, accumulate, terminate, and so forth.
Distribution, therefore, requires interpreting and applying the sometimes
complex language of the trust instrument; and it commonly involves
contact with the current beneficiaries, in order to keep abreast of their
needs and circumstances.
In former centuries, when ancestral land was the prototypical trust
asset, these three functions of trusteeship were inextricably merged. The
trustees were often not much more than nominees-mere stakeholders
-and the family that lived on the land managed it. As financial assets have
become the characteristic asset of the modem managerial trust, there is
ever less reason for these three relatively disparate functions-investment,
administration, and distribution-to remain consolidated in a single pair of
hands. No deep connection exists between, for example, being good at
working with beneficiaries on the distribution side, and being expert at
investing trust funds or preparing fiduciary tax returns.
As Modem Portfolio Theory and the modernized prudent investor
norm drive fiduciaries to use ever larger portfolios, there will be ever less
reason to think that family trustees, and even small bank trustees, can
120. UPIA § 3 cmt.
121. But see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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competently conduct the investment function in-house. The delegation
doctrine that is legitimated under the 1992 Restatement and the Uniform
Act facilitates the use of outside investment products and outside
investment managers. Bank trust departments are making ever greater use
of mutual funds!" When the funds are internally managed, they
constitute a close alternative to bank-operated common trust funds. When
the bank as trustee uses externally managed mutual funds, the trustee
commonly retains the asset allocation decisions for the particular trust in-
house while effectively delegating detailed portfolio management to the
outside investment company. This is an intermediate position between
completely internalized investment management and complete delegation
of the investment function.
One consequence of legitimating the delegation of investment
functions will likely be a greater willingness on the part of lawyers to serve
114as trustees. Lawyers bring expertise to the interpretation of trust
instruments, and the typical law firm exhibits more stable personnel
practices than the perennial revolving door that has been such a troubling
feature of bank trust departments. Thus, on the distribution side, lawyers
and law firms have formidable comparative advantages as fiduciaries. By
contrast, lawyers have no particular reason to be in the investment
business-at least if the investment function entails the work of actively
constructing and maintaining portfolios as opposed to making or
overseeing asset allocation decisions among externally managed portfolios.
The delegation doctrine may encourage more lawyers and law firms to
accept trusteeships, by keeping distribution work in-house, while facilitating
the delegation of detailed investment and administrative functions to
specialized providers.
H. Principal and Income
I conclude my efforts to peer into the future of trust investing by
turning to a seemingly quite distinct subject: the rules governing how
trustees allocate the receipts from trust investments between principal and
income. The new trust-investment law is undermining the practices that
trustees have long followed for discharging their duty of impartiality to
multiple beneficiaries. We are learning that the duties of prudent investing
and of impartiality have had a more intimate connection than has been
understood. Traditional principal-and-income concepts will not survive in
the world of MPT-driven investing.
122. Seesupra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
123. The subject has its own treatise: Melanie L. Fein et al., Mutual Fund Activities of
Banks (1998).
124. I have elsewhere had occasion to point to some of the advantages that lawyers can
bring to trusteeship as well as some of the dangers. John H. Langbein, Taking a Look at the
Pluses and Minuses of the Practice, 128 Tr. & Est. 10 (Dec. 1989). The American Bar
Association's most recent guidance on the topic is reported in Bradley R. Cook, Principles for
Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, 6 Prob. & Prop. 6 (Mar./Apr. 1992).
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Most trusts provide for multiple interests, commonly a life estate,
followed by remainders-for example, to my widow for her life, remainder
to my issue. Trust law requires the trustee in such cases to adhere to what
is called the duty of impartiality. The Restatement version says: "If a trust is
created for beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under a duty to the
successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to their respective
interests."'2 In allocating the receipts and expenses of the trust, the
current beneficiary "is entitled to, and only to, the net income" 2' of the
trust. Other investment returns, especially capital appreciation, accrue to
the corpus of the trust. The Uniform Principal and Income Act2 and
comparable nonuniform legislation regulate corporate distributions,
assigning dividends and interest to income, while accruing stock splits and
other capital-account transactions to the remainder interest.
In former centuries, when agricultural real estate was the typical trust
asset, the concept of net income had an intuitive, largely self-defining basis,
which left scant discretion in the trustee. The life tenant was entitled to the
fruits and rents of the land. Difficulty in ascertaining what was income
arose only at the margin, with gravel pits and timber stands and the
like.1 2 8 As the portfolio of financial assets displaced agricultural land from
the prototypical modem trust, the concept of trust income became vastly
more manipulable in the hands of the trustee.
In modem circumstances, the trustee's investment decisions largely
determine the income allocation to the current beneficiary. If the trustee
loads the portfolio with the shares of so-called growth companies that
retain their profits for internal expansion and pay little or no dividends,
conventional income will be impaired. By contrast, were the trustee to skew
the portfolio toward high-yielding stocks and bonds, which tend to deliver
most of their return in dividends and interest rather than to experience
much capital appreciation, the trust's investment policy would favor the
current beneficiary and impair the remainder interest. At either extreme,
or anywhere between, the trustee who has investment discretion effectively
chooses the income level by choosing the investments. The duty of impartiality
constrains the trustee by requiring "due regard" to the interests of
principal and income, but within the sphere of discretion that the duty of
impartiality permits, trustees commonly make investment decisions with a
view to achieving the desired income level.
By distorting investment choices in order to maximize a particular
form of return (whether dividends and interest or capital appreciation),
conventional trust investment practices that are designed to satisfy
125. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 232 (1959).
126. Id. § 233(1)(a). Manifestly, this default regime is altered when the trust grants the
trustee discretion over whether or in what shares to distribute income, or when the trust
grants the trustee a power to invade corpus for the income beneficiaries.
127. Unif Principal & Income Act (1937 & 1964 Acts), 7B U.L.A. 183 (1985).
128. Notable topics in the early treatise, Edwin A. Howes, Jr., The American Law Relating
to Income and Principal 5-12 (1905).
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principal-and-income concerns come into tension with Modem Portfolio
Theory. Thus, for example, the trustee who is administering a trust that
needs to achieve a high level of current income may feel obliged to invest
heavily in bonds, even though it is known that equities outperform bonds
across the long term on a total-return basis. The conventional principal-
and-income rules drive that trustee to accept a lower total return in order
to obtain a particular form of returnm-interest rather than capital
appreciation. In many trust portfolios that could prudently tolerate greater
risk by holding a higher proportion of equities, the trustees have refrained
from investing appropriately in equities because such a portfolio commonly
produces less current income.
The lesson, in the words of Joel Dobris, is that "investing should not
be connected with principal and income allocation."'2 Instead, the
trustee should first invest to maximize total return, and then, in a separate
and subsequent step, "allocate the return as fairly as possible." '" In a
prominent artide published in 1986, Jeffrey Gordon observed that skewing
the portfolio to achieve a particular income/principal allocation also
impairs diversification.1'3
Our traditional notion that the current beneficiary automatically
receives all the "income" has concealed from us the truth that the trustee's
investment policy largely determines how much that income will be.
Accordingly, an MPT-driven regime that would allow the trustee to invest
for the maximum return suitable to the trust, regardless of form, and then
to allocate to income that portion that the trustee determines to be
appropriate for discharging the duty of impartiality, would involve no
fundamental departure from the inner functional balance of the present
law. Under either scheme, the trustee decides how much of the trust's
investment return to devote to the income interest. But greater candor
about the relationship between investing and allocating would allow the
trustee to follow investment practices that would produce superior returns
for both current and remainder beneficiaries.
Two main suggestions have been made for devising allocation
129. Joel C. Dobris, The Probate World at the End of the Century: Is a New Principal and
Income Act in Your Future?, 28 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 393, 412 (1993).
130. Id.
131. Such a portfolio "is not optimally diversified" because it
has not been assembled with the objective of producing the greatest expected
returns for the risk. It is easy to see why systematic exclusion of companies with low
dividends but high reinvestment rates upsets a diversification scheme, but there is no
assurance that a portfolio that emphasizes balance between high and low dividend
paying securities will be well-diversified otherwise. The point is that the allocation of
total returns between "income" and "principal" forced by settled trust law is
profoundly inconsistent with the portfolio theory paradigm.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Survival of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, in
Longstreth, supra note 29, at 195, 210, substantialy r4ptinted in Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52, 100-01
(1987).
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formulas to facilitate total-return investing: the unitrust, and equitable
reallocation. The unitrust is common in the world of foundations and
charitable trusts, 13 2 (and in tax planning for individuals after the
enactment of Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code). Under a
unitrust, all the investment gains for the accounting period are initially
assigned to principal, without regard to form (that is, whether dividends,
interest, or capital appreciation). Thereafter, a spending formula (Tor
example, five percent of principal, or the inflation rate plus two percent) is
used to determine the share for current-year distribution. It is no accident
that the unitrust has thus far thrived mostly in the tax-exempt world of the
IRC § 501(c) (3) organization, where there is no tax reward for preferring
capital gains over dividends and interest, and no tax penalty for
recognizing capital gains. That is to say, our rules of taxation, as well as
our rules for allocating principal and income, can impede total-return
investing for taxable trusts.
Under a system of equitable reallocation, the trustee would retain the
conventional form-driven categories as the initial stage of principal-and-
income allocation. If, however, the trustee were to determine that the
outcome achieved for the particular trust by applying those form-driven
rules did not correctly balance the needs of current and remainder
beneficiaries, the trustee would have the duty to reallocate the returns in
order to discharge the duty of impartiality.
As I write, a Uniform Law Commission drafting committee is wrestling
with proposed revisions to the Uniform Principal and Income Act,
including the challenge of adapting the principal-and-income rules to the
world of total-return investing under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.
The committee considered unitrust solutions but is presently inclined to
recommend a limited form of equitable reallocation. M It remains to be
seen whether this proposal will survive in the draft, and whether the full
Commission will endorse it.
I suspect that some decades will be needed to harmonize fully the
present tensions among total return-investing as facilitated by the prudent
investor paradigm, recognition-based income taxation, and principal-and-
income law. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act does not even address
these issues. But by committing American trust-investment law to the main
principles of Modem Portfolio Theory, the Act has brought awareness of
these tensions onto the agenda that confronts legal policymakers and
practicing lawyers in trust and estate law, and that is a giant first step.
132. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, University, and
Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the World of
Spending Rules, 28 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 49 (1993).
13. See IRC § 2702 (1990) (creating special valuation rules in case of transfers of interests
in trusts); Louis S. Harrison, The Real Implications of the New Transfer Tax Valuation Rules:
Success or Failure?, 47 Tax L 885, 916 (1994).
134. Unif Principal and Income Act (Oct. 1995 draft).
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